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A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 26(b)(4)(8): 
THE EXPERT TWICE RETAINED 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for limited dis-
covery of experts hired for both trial and non-trial purposes. 1 The 
Rules, however, do not distinguish between discovery of an ex-
pert working for his original employer and discovery of an expert 
whose original employer is no longer involved in the litigation and 
who is retained by another party to the litigation. 2 Presently, 
upon the conclusion of litigation by one party to a multi-party 
suit, the expert who had been retained by the party leaving the 
litigation, the so-called "free agent" expert, may generally be re-
tained by any other party to the litigation. 3 
The retention of the free agent expert will most frequently 
occur in areas where multi-party litigation requiring the aid of ex-
perts is common. Thus, tort litigation, especially in the products 
liability and medical malpractice areas, provides the most likely 
context for free agent retention. 4 This article is premised on the 
belief that the free agent is frequently hired not to aid his new em-
ployer, but rather to keep the free agent from providing another 
party to the litigation with substantive evidence detrimental to the 
hiring party's case. 5 In a medical malpractice case, for example, a 
plaintiff may settle his claim with one defendant at a reduced lia-
bility in order to retain the defendant's expert, who has developed 
1 FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(4)(A) & (B) [hereinafter cited as "Rules"]. 
2 An expert hired under these circumstances will be referred to as a "free agent" expert 
in order to distinguish him from all other experts, who will be referred to as "regularly 
retained." It should be noted that the designations "free agent" and "regularly retained" 
refer to the circumstances surrounding the expert's retention, rather than to his function. 
Thus, free agent experts as well as regularly retained experts may be employed as trial or 
non-trial experts. 
3 See, e.g., Granger v. Smeal Mfg. Co., No. 76-CI-0200 (Cir. Ct. Washington County, 
Wis. Aug. 29, 1978) (on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW RE-
FORM). 
• See Part II B I infra for a fuller discussion of the contexts for employment of the free 
agent expert. 
• In one recent multi-party products liability case the plaintiff argued: 
[a]ttomey Gass now objects to our efforts to depose Dr. Weiss as to matters he 
did on behalf of West Bend Mutual, and he bases his argument on his after the 
fact relationship with Dr. Weiss. It does not comport with logic that an attorney 
should thus be able to purchase_ the concealment of a[n] [expert] witness .... 
Brief for the Plaintiff at 2, Granger v. Smeal Mfg. Co., No. 76-Cl-0200 (Cir. Ct. Washing-
ton County, Wis. July 7, 1978) (on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF 
LAW REFORM). 
This problem also occurs under state discovery rules_ which differ from the Federal 
Rules. See, e.g., Williamson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 21 Cal. 3d 829, 582 P.2d 
126, 148 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1978). 
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a persuasive theory which might exonerate all defendants. 6 This 
concealment of information may also take place at the conclusion 
of trial, since the plaintiff would still seek to retain, and thus con-
ceal, the information possessed by defendant's expert. 7 
This article will focus on whether the hiring of the free agent as 
a non-trial expert, in order to conceal information from other par-
ties to the litigation, is in keeping with the underlying goals and 
values of present discovery practice. Part I of this note discusses 
the discoverability of experts in general, then examines the vari-
ous rationales underlying the so-called unfairness doctrine sup-
porting the trial/non-trial expert distinction. Part II presents the 
case for divergent treatment of the free agent and the regularly re-
tained expert. Subpart A of that section will explain the lack of 
judicial scrutiny in this area, while Subpart B will explore the ap-
plication of the present trial/non-trial expert discovery distinction 
to the free agent expert. The analysis in Part II concludes that the 
existing discovery rules should be modified to discourage the hir-
ing of experts to conceal information. This modification of pres-
ent discovery is suggested in Part III as an amendment to Rule 26, 
which presently governs the discovery of experts. Both the analy-
sis of and the proposed amendment to the Federal Rule are 
equally applicable to many state discovery rules. 8 
8 Since defendants in products liability cases frequently condition settlement with par-
ticularly diligent plaintiffs' attorneys upon an agreement that plaintiff's counsel refuse to 
represent subsequent plaintiffs seeking to sue that defendant, it is no surprise that one 
party might similarly seek to prevent an expert from working for an opposing party. See 
3A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 46 A.07(1] at 16A-97 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN]. See also Sullivan v. Sturm, Ruger & 
Co., Inc., 80 F.R.D. 489, 490 (D. Mont. 1978); Barkwell v. Sturm Ruger Co., Inc., 79 
F.R.D. 444, 445 (D. Alas. 1978); 
For an excellent example of one state court's refusal to allow such practice under its 
discovery rules, see Williamson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 21 Cal. 3d 829, 582 P.2d 
126, 148 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1978). 
7 There are two relevant distinctions between the concealment attempted after settle-
ment and the concealment attempted after trial. First, in the settlement situation, the 
former plaintiff has a greater opportunity to hire the free agent than does any other party 
to the litigation since he may retain the expert after the settlement has been finalized but 
before it has been announced. Second, the settlement situation limits the opportunity for 
other defendants to learn about the information plaintiff seeks to conceal, since, if the 
case were to be presented at trial, some of the information would be revealed. Despite 
these distinctions the analysis presented in this article is .equally applicable to both the 
expert who has become a free agent at the conclusion of the trial and the expert who has 
become a free agent by virtue of his employer's settfement; the issue of concealment is the 
same in each. 
8 The following states have copied the federal rule verbatim or with modifications which 
do not effect either the analysis or the proposed amendment: Alabama (ALA. R. C1v. P. 
26(b)(4)(B)); Alaska (ALASKA R. C1v. P. 26(b)(4)(B)); Arizona (ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 
26(b)(4)(B)); Colorado (COLO. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(4)(B)); Delaware (DEL. R. C1v. P. 
26(b)(4)(B)); Georgia (GA. R. C1v. P. 81A-126(b)(4)(B)); Idaho (IDAHO R. C1v. P. 
26(b)(4)(B)); Indiana (IND. R. C1v. P. 26(B)(3)(a)); Iowa (low AR. C1v. P. 122(b)(4)(B)); 
Kansas (KAN .. R. C1v. P. 60-226(b)(4)(B)); Kentucky (KY. R. C1v. P. 26.02(4)(B)); Mas-
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I. PRESENT DISCOVERY PRACTICE 
A. Generally 
Presently, the discovery of expert witnesses - both regularly re-
tained and free agent experts - is governed primarily by the gen-
eral discovery provisions of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 26(b)(l) provides that parties may obtain discov-
ery of any matter not privileged so long as it is relevant to the sub-
ject matter involved in the action. 9 However, the disco'very of 
facts known and opinions held by experts~ otherwise discoverable 
under Rule 26(b)(l), is limited in several important ways. 
Discovery of experts "retained or specially employed in antici-
pation of litigation" 10 turns first on the characterization of the 
expert as a trial or non-trial expert. Discovery of trial experts is a 
two-step process under Rule 26(b)(4). First, through inter-
rogatories, a party may require any other party to the litigation to 
identify his expert trial witnesses, state the subject matter to 
which they will testify, and submit a summary of the grounds for 
sachusetts (MAss.R. C1v. P. 26(b)(4)(B)); Minnesota (MINN. R. C1v. P. 26.02(4)(B)); Mon-
tana (MONT. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(4)(B)); Nevada (NEV. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(4)(B)); North Dakota 
(N.D. R. C1v. P. 26(b)); Ohio (OHIO R. C1v. P. 26(B)(4)(a)); Washington (WASH. R. C1v. 
P. 26(b)(4)(B)); West Virginia ( W. VA. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(4)(B)); Wisconsin (Wis. R. C1v. P. 
804.01(2)(d)(2)); Vermont (VT. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(4)(B)); Virginia (VA. R. C1v. P. 
4: I(b)(4)(B)). 
9 Rule 26(b)(I) provides: 
In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it 
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or 
defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, 
condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the 
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It 
is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the 
trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence. 
10 Rule 26(b)(4)(B) provides: 
A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been 
r~tained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or 
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, 
only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances 
under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or 
opinions on the same subject by other means. 
The phrase "retained or specially employed" is a limitation contained in Rule 26(b)(4)(B) 
which excludes experts consulted· on an informal basis from 26(b)(4)(B) treatment. 
Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66, 68 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("(E]xperts who are consulted by a plain-
tiff on an informal basis are not subject to discovery."). For a discussion of the possible 
distinctions between "retained" and "specially employed" see Virginia Electric and 
Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding and Orv Dock Co .. 68 F.R.D. 397, 407-08 !E.D. Va. 1975), 
holding that "the 'in house expert' is to be treated, for purposes of discovery, as an ordi-
nary witness." 
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each opinion. 11 Second, upon motion, the court may order 
further discovery as it deems appropriate. 12 
With the exception of a physician's report under Rule 35(b), 
discovery of non-trial experts is contingent upon a showing of 
"exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for 
the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the 
same subject by other means." 13 The Rules make no attempt to 
differentiate between the free agent expert and the regularly re-
tained expert. The discoverability of a free agent expert hired 
upon the termination of his original employment thus depends on 
whether he is used as a trial or non-trial expert. 14 The policies set 
forth as justifications for the disparate treatment of trial and non-
trial experts will be evaluated below. 
B. The Unfairness Doctrine 
Prior to the adoption of Rule 26, courts did not distinguish be-
tween discovery of trial and non-trial experts. Discovery was 
considered a matter of judicial discretion and was generally de-
nied on one of three grounds: attorney-client privilege, 15 attorney 
11 Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i). This Rule provides: 
A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each per-
son whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the 
subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the sub-
stance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a 
summary of the grounds for each opinion. 
12 Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). This Rule provides: "Upon motion, the court may order further 
discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such provisions, 
pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court 
may deem appropriate." 
13 See note IO supra. 
1 • The retention of a free agent has been held not to be an exceptional circumstance per 
se. Granger v. Smeal Mfg. Co., No. 76-CI-0200 (Cir. Ct. Washington County, Wis. Aug. 
29, 1978) (on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM). In fact, 
the court refused to consider the argument that the retention of a free agent presented a 
situation that was not analogous to the employment of the regularly retained expert. 
15 In Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co., 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1974), the court 
ruled that the attorney client privilege covered the plaintiff's expert since he was acting as 
the attorney's agent. Id. at 687. In Brink v. Multnomah County, 224 Ore. 507,356 P.2d 536 
(1960), the court held that where an appraiser had been employed by a condemnor to ob-
serve the property in question and to act as a consultant and advisor to the deputy district 
attorney representing the condemnor, communications made by the appraiser to the depu-
ty district attorney fell within the lawyer client privilege. Id. at 516-17, 356 P.2d at 540. See 
also American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prod. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 685-86 
(D.R.I. 1959); Schuyler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. lll, 113 (M.D. Pa. 1950); City 
and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d. 227, 238, 231 P.2d 26, 31-32 
(1951). 
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work product, 16 or the rule of unfairness. 1 7 The acceptance of 
Rule 26 marked the rejection of the first two rationales in favor of 
the "unfairness doctrine." 18 Over the years, three aspects of the 
"unfairness doctrine" have been articulated by courts and com-
mentators in seeking to limit the discovery of experts: the prop-
erty problem, the laziness problem, and the discouragement prob-
lem. The property and laziness problems are judicially-created 
doctrines arguing against discovery of experts in general; the dis-
couragement problem has thus far been suggested only by the 
commentators, but seems to have been in the minds of the Advis-
ory Committee members in drawing the trial/non-trial expert dis-
tinction in Rule 26. This section examines these three policy for-
mulations in order to see how they have been integrated into Rule 
26(b)(4)(B) and to determine the policies behind the trial/non-trial 
expert distinction. 
1. The Property Problem-One of the earliest judicial attempts 
to limit discovery of an expert's information occurred in Lewis v. 
United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 19 where the court held that dis-
covery of another party's expert was akin to taking the party's 
property without compensation. 20 This aspect of the unfairness 
doctrine will be referred to as the property problem. The property 
problem was most frequently articulated in early cases21 in which 
1 
• In Carpenter - Trant Drilling Cci. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257 (D. 
Neb. 1959), the court held that where the driller's counsel had employed experts to make 
written reports on technical aspects of the case, requests for production of those reports 
would be denied as an attempt to acquire production of the counsel's work product. Id. at 
261. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Havee, 123 So. 2d. 572, 574-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); 
State Rd. Dep't of Florida v. Cline, 122 So. 2d 827,828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Empire 
Box Corp. v. Illinois Cereal Mills, 47 Del. 283, 294, 90 A.2d 672, 678 (Super. Ct. 1952). But 
see Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570,570 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. 
Nysco Labs, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Leding v. United States Rubber 
Co., 23 F.R.D. 220, 221 (D. Mont. 1959). 
1 7 The unfairness doctrine is a shorthand label for three concerns of commentators and 
courts regarding the discoverability of experts. These three concerns will be explored in 
Part I B. Cases which discuss these concerns include United States v. 2001.10 Acres of 
Land, 48 F.R.D. 305,308 (N.D. Ga. 1969); McGinnis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. 
Supp. 739, 742 (E.D. La. 1962); United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 
Etc., 203 F. Supp. 75, 77-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Walsh v. Reynolds Metal Co., 15 F.R.D. 
376, 378-79 (D.N.J. 1954); Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88, 89 (E.D. Pa. 1952); 
Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D. Mass. 1941); Lewis v. 
United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940). But see United States 
v. 364.82 Acres of Land, Etc., 38 F.R.D. 411, 415-16 (N.D. Cal. 1965). 
18 Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, 48 F.R.D. 485, 503-05 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Commit-
tee Notes]. 
1 • 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940). 
20 "To permit a party by deposition to examine an expert of the opposite party before 
trial, to whom the latter has obligated himself to pay a considerable sum of money, would 
be equivalent to taking another's property without making any compensation therefor." 
Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940). 
21 Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co .. , 7 F.R.D. 684, 686-87 (D. Mass. 1947); 
Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594,596 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Boynton v. 
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593,595 (D. Mass. 1941). 
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no distinction was drawn between the trial and non-trial expert. 
Clearly, however, the concept of the expert as ".property" is out 
of step with modern discovery policy. For example, litigants fre-
quently go to great expense to locate eyewitnesses to important 
events. Yet there is no precedent permitting a party to silence 
such witnesses in the face of requests for information simply be-
cause the adverse party has not shared the costs of obtaining the 
witness' testimony. 22 By 1970, courts had largely rejected the 
property rationale for the limiting of discovery of expert wit-
nesses under the unfairness doctrine. 23 
The property rationale was most soundly rejected with the 
promulgation of Rule 26. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) explicitly allows dis-
covery of trial experts; similarly, under the "exceptional cir-
cumstances" standard of Rule 26(b)(4)(B), limited non-trial ex-
pert discovery is permitted. However, the Rules Committee dem-
onstrated the weight they placed on the unfairness doctrine by 
providing for a scheme of compensation to serve as a condition of 
discovery. Although under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)24 compensation of 
. the responding party is not required when trial experts are served 
with interrogatories, 25 further discovery of trial experts may, in 
the court's discretion, require reasonable compensation. 26 Such 
compensation is always required for discovery of non-trial ex-
perts. 27 Thus, Rule 26(b)(4)(C) neutralizes the property problem 
11 See Rule 26. See also Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert 
Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455, 483 (1962); Note, Discovery of Experts: A Historical 
Problem and a Proposed FRCP Solution,.53 MINN. L. REv. 785. 798 (1969). 
23 In Leding v. United States Rubber Co., 23 F.R.D. 220 (D. Mont. 1959), the court held 
that where both parties had expended considerable resources in obtaining information, 
the property rationale should not be used to hinder the mutual discovery necessary for 
meritorious trial adjudication. Id. at 222. In Henlopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 33 
F.R.D. 306 (D. Del. 1963), the court held that the property rationale was inapplicable 
where the moving party offered to pay a reasonable portion of the resisting party's expert 
fee. Id. at 308. In United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968), the court broadly 
held that any rationale that would deny a litigant the testimony of a witness simply be-
cause his opponent reached the expert first and paid for his services was unacceptable. Id. 
at 76. 
•• Rule 26(b)(4)(C) provides: 
Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the party 
seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery under subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this rule; and (ii) with 
respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court 
may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(B) 
of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other 
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter 
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by mandating a fair payment to the party responding to discov-
ery. 2s 
2. The Laziness Problem-A second aspect of the· unfairness 
doctrine articulated by the courts is the laziness problem. Like 
the property rationale, the laziness argument would limit discov-
ery of experts in general, and does not distinguish between trial 
and non-trial experts. The first expression of this problem ap-
peared in McCarthy v. Palmer. 29 In that case the court reasoned 
that liberal discovery was not intended to be a shield behind 
which parties who had not hired experts could make use of the 
preparation of an opponent's expert. 30 Liberal discovery of ex-
perts, the court feared, would be detrimental to those parties who 
have prepared their case in advance, and would aid only those 
parties who did not retain experts until the last minute. As one 
commentator has suggested, "discovery was hardly intended to 
enable a learned profession to perform its functions ... on wits 
borrowed from the adversary." 31 Taken to its logical conclusion, 
the laziness rationale would forbid discovery altogether. 
The Advisory Committee responded to the laziness problem by 
setting up a system under which each party must label its experts 
as trial or non-trial experts before discovery can begin. As a prac-
tical matter this approach forces parties to prepare their own case 
in advance, since the opponent's trial expert is not discoverable 
until the deposing party has declared which of its own experts will 
28 "These provisions for fees and expenses meet the objection that it is unfair to permit 
one side to obtain without cost the benefit of an expert's work for which the other side has 
paid, often a substantial sum." Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 18, at 505 (citing 
Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940)). By giving clear 
notice of the conditions for discovery of experts, the Rules go a long way towards protect-
ing whatever reliance interest a party may have in its expert's work product. This reliance 
interest should continue to be respected; any change in free agent discovery should be 
effected prospectively. 
2
• 29 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.N. Y. 1939), aff 'd 113 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 
(1940). 
30 
While the Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to permit liberal ... discov-
ery, they were not intended to be made the vehicle through which one litigant 
could make use of his opponent's preparation of his case. To use them in such a 
manner would penalize the diligent and place a premium on laziness. 
Id. at 586. 
It is clear that the words "penalize· the diligent" are not part of the laziness problem. It 
would seem that the McCarthy court was foreshadowing the development of the property 
concept articulated one year later in Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 
21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940). See Part I B l supra. For cases which follow the McCarthy 
rationale, see Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 188 F. Supp. 135, 136 (E.D.Pa. 1960); Schuyler v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111, 113 (M.D. Pa. 1950). 
31 Note, supra note 22, at 785. 
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testify. 32· The present Rules do not preclude parties who have not 
retained experts or do not plan to use their experts at trial from 
conducting discovery. They do, however, subject to the discre-
tion of the court, preclude a party from designating a trial expert 
subsequent to discovery. 33 As for non-trial experts, the "excep-
tional circumstances" standard of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) allows discov-
ery of non-trial experts only where it is impracticable for the 
party seeking discovery to obtain the needed information by other 
means. This trial/non-trial expert distinction reflects in part the 
belief that it is a greater inequity for a lazy party to discover non-
trial expert information than it is for that party to discover trial 
expert info_rmation. The theory supporting this belief is that a trial 
expert's information will be revealed at trial and therefore dis-
covery only advances the time of disclosure. Since the non-trial 
expert's information will remain undisclosed unless discovery is 
allowed, discovery of that work is deemed the greater offense. 
3. The Discouragement Problem-Although the third aspect of 
the unfairness doctrine, the discouragement problem, has not re-
ceived judicial articulation, it has been discussed by several 
commentators. 34 This problem essentially involves the conflict 
between two important interests, encouraging parties to hire ex-
31 The Advisory Committee ·Notes, supra note 18, at 504, support this analysis: 
Discovery is limited to trial witnesses and may be obtained only at a time when 
the parties know who their expert witnesses will be. A party must as a practical 
matter prepare his own case in advance of that time, for he can hardly hope to 
build his case on his opponent's experts. 
33 See Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 488; Graham, Discovery of Experts, 1976 U. ILL. 
L.F. 895, 904 (1976). 
u See Graham, Discovery of Experts, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169 (1977); Note.Proposed 1967 
Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 C0LUM. L. REV. 271, 282 (1968); De-
velopments in the Law -Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1032 (196lf; Note, Discovery of 
Experts, supra note 21, at 797-98. Of the articles noted, only the Graham article has dis-
cussed the problem in great depth. His conclusions are: 
Discovery of an expert witness retained or specially employed by an opponent 
not expected to be called at trial raises a conflict between the principle of full 
disclosure of all relevant facts, data, and opinions and the principle of encourag-
ing a party to seek expert advice free from all fear that a retained expert who fails 
to be of assistance will become available to the opponent. Various considerations 
support the belief that a party should be free to consult an expert without any fear 
of the expert subsequently disclosing information to an opponent. A party obvi-
ously hopes that the time, money, and effort extended to locate and prepare an 
expert will not result in valuable expert assistance for an opponent. Moreover, in 
the process of consulting the expert a person may disclose facts and discuss liti-
gation strategy as part of the team preparation effort for trial. Any disclosure of 
such information to an opponent would be extremely damaging, and any attempt 
to isolate or restrict successfully the disclosure by the expert to only the informa-
tion previously possessed would be an impossibility. Rules of procedure govern-
ing the discovery of expert witnesses must protect a party from an expert witness 
previously consulted walking into the opponent's arms. 
Graham, supra, at 194-95. 
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perts and allowing liberal disclosure of experts' findings. On the 
one hand, liberal discovery of expert conclusions arguably dis-
courages expert retention due to the fear that the expert might un-
cover and be forced to disclose to the opposition information det-
rimental to his employer. Further, parties would be less likely to 
be candid with their experts and more likely to hire experts who 
would commit themselves to taking a favorable position even be-
fore making a preliminary evaluation of the task. On the other 
hand, full disclosure of information is needed to narrow and to 
simplify issues at trial and to educate parties as to the merits of 
their claims and defenses. Litigants who would not feel free to 
employ experts for educational purposes would be less informed 
as to the merits of their case. 
In promulgating Rule 26, the Advisory Committee was faced 
with the task of balancing the interest in full disclosure of all rele-
vant information against the interest in encouraging parties to 
seek expert advice. In striking that balance, the Committee de-
cided that since the adversary system functions best with edu-
cated litigants, parties should be allowed to hire experts to edu-
cate them on the merits of their case without fear that they would 
be forced to turn detrimental information over to an opposing 
party. 35 Thus, the Advisory Committee provided for the trial/ 
non-trial expert distinction, according to which trial experts are 
subject to liberal discovery while discovery of their non-trial 
counterparts is much more limited. Since the information pos-
sessed by a trial expert is usually beneficial to his party's case, 
and since the discovery of trial experts only advances the time at 
which such information is revealed, 36 liberal discovery of trial 
experts is a sensible rule. Moreover, this liberal discovery elimi-
nates surprise at trial and improves the quality of cross-
examination. 37 Where detrimental information exists, it may, in 
the absence of "exceptional circumstances," be shielded from 
exposure at trial simply by designating the expert a non-trial ex-
pert. 38 In short, the goal of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is to encourage the 
35 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 18, at 503-04; Note, supra note 34, at 282. 
38 United States v. 38 Cases, More or Less, Mr. Enzyme, 35 F.R.D. 357,364 (W.D. Pa. 
1964); Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548, 550 (E.D. Wis. 
1947); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425,428 (N .D. Ohio 
1947); Note, supra note 34, at 282. See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) 
("The deposition-discovery procedu"re simply advances the stage at which the disclosure 
can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it .... ''). 
37 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 18, at 503-04; 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
,r 26.66 [I] at 26-479 (2d ed. 1976); Note, supra note 34, at 282. 
38 In the case of the regularly retained expert, this does not deny information to the trial 
process, since other experts are generally available to provide the same information. 
Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 483-84. Exceptional circumstances are found only in cases 
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retention of unbiased experts at the earliest stage of litigation in 
order to educate parties on the merits of their c~se. 39 
Having isolated the policy reasons for distinguishing between 
trial and non-trial expert discovery, this article will next consider 
the present treatment of free agent experts, and whether such 
treatment is consistent with those policies. 40 
where it is impracticable for the discovering party to obtain information in any other man-
ner. Rule 26(bX4XB), supra note 10. See Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co., 60 F.R.D. 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 
F.R.D. 11. 14 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
39 In order to understand the accepted rationale of the Advisory Committee better, it is 
important to understand what other options were open to them. Rule 26, as a balance be-
tween the need for full disclosure of relevant information and the need to encourage par-
ties to seek expert advice, clearly places greater weight on the latter value. In light of the 
later cases this value judgment was "a rather conservative" one, C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
COURTS 401 (3d ed. 1976), and was not universally received with enthusiasm. 8 C. WRIGHT 
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2029 at 250, n.57 (1970). More lib-
eral disclosure of expert information was, of course, the committee's other option. Those 
who favored this course argued that the problem with the "exceptional circumstances" 
formulation was that it did not respond to the need for information in fair trial adjudica-
tion, but rather depended on whether it was "practicable" for the party seeking discovery 
to retain its own expert and to give him adequate opportunity to form an opinion. Further, 
since a discovering party would not know what facts the opposing experts had discovered 
or what opinions they had formed, it would rarely be possible for the discovery party to 
make the required showing of "exceptional circumstances." Id., § 2032 at 256. Also 
criticized was the drafters' principal concern - the discouragement problem. As already 
suggested, this argument postulates that discoverability of non-trial experts will discour-
age their retention and reduce the information available to each party. The problem with 
this line of reasoning is that it assumes that the parties have a choice not to retain an ex-
pert. In the vast majority of cases in which experts are hired, they are indispensible. Often 
the plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof without an expert. Similarly, the defendant 
cannot hope to refute this burden without his expert. This was recognized in the Advisory 
Committee Notes, supra note 18, at 503, where the Committee stated, "Many of these 
cases present intricate and difficult issues as to which expert testimony is likely to be de-
terminative." Thus, to the extent that the hiring of experts is not entirely a matter of 
choice, the discouragement rationale for limiting discovery is less persuasive. See Note, 
supra note 34, at 282. An alternative would be to put the burden of showing abuse on the 
answering party rather than on the party seeking information, as Rule 26(b)(4XB) does. 
See Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 488. A freer flow of information would, in theory at 
least, (1) assist in discovering truth and preventing perjury; (2) cut down on the number of 
false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses; (3) provide a simple, convenient, and 
inexpensive way of obtaining facts otherwise obtainable only with great difficulty or not at 
all; (4) educate parties as to the merits of their claims and defenses, thus encouraging set-
tlements out of court; and (5) narrow and simplify issues for trial. Under a more liberal 
approach to discovery, a higher correlation between settlement and validity of claim 
would result. 
• 0 Although it would be logical at this point to seek further refinement of the trial/non-
trial expert distinction by examining what constitutes "exceptional circumstances" and 
by analogizing to the disclosure provisions of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY [hereinafter cited as CODE], neither source provides substantial guidance. Cases 
involving the Rule 26(b)(4XB) "exceptional circumstances" standard merely restate the 
rule without providing sufficient analysis. This has been noted by both the courts and the 
commentators. See Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1137 
(S.D. Tex. 1976); Graham; supra note 33, at 932. See generally Annot .• 33 A.L.R. Fed. 
403, 465-76 (1977). 
Similarly, the CODE provides little guidance. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY E.C. 7-27 is vague, requiring only that "a lawyer should not suppress evidence 
that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce." D.R. 7-102(A)(5) states 
that an attorney cannot "[k]nowingly make a false statement oflaw or fact." With respect 
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II. THE CASE FOR DIVERGENT TREATMENT OF THE FREE AGENT 
EXPERT AND THE REGULARLY RETAINED EXPERT 
A. The Non/aw of the Free Agent Expert: Lack 
of Judicial Scrutiny 
The distinction between the free agent expert and the regularly 
retained expert has yet to be recognized by either the com-
mentators or the courts. 41 Judges automatically apply the same 
to disclosure, however, the rule provides only that an attorney cannot "[c]onceal or 
knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal." D.R. 7-102(A)(3). 
Although it is the duty of an attorney appearing in a pending case to advise the court of 
decisions adverse to his client's contention that are known to him and unknown to his 
adversary, ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 146 (1935), this too is 
uninstructive, as it applies to precedental cases rather than to expert information. It has 
been suggested by one scholar who favors greater disclosure of information that this pro-
hibition of the concealment of legal precedent should be extended to experts• work prod-
uct as well. Judge Marvin Frankel, in the 31st Annual Benjamin Cardozo Lecture, pro-
posed a reformation of D.R. 7-102. In part it provides: 
(I) In his representation of a client, unless prevented from doing so by a 
privilege reasonably believed to apply, a lawyer shall (a) Report to the court and 
opposing counsel the existence of relevant evidence or witnesses where the 
lawyer does not intend to offer such evidence or witnesses; (b) Prevent, or when 
prevention has proved unsuccessful, report to the court and opposing counsel the 
making of any untrue statement by client or witness or any omission to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 
Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1057-58 
(1975). The key words in this formulation have been borrowed from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission's rule !Ob-5. See 17 CFR § 240.!0b-5 (1974). As Frankel explains, 
"that should serve not only for respectability; it should also answer the complaint that the 
rule would impose impossibly stringent standards. The morals we have evolved for busi-
ness clients cannot be deemed unattainable by the legal profession." Frankel at 1058. The 
question, however, is not whether they are attainable but whether they are desirable. For 
instance, it may be argued that if non-trial expert information is discoverable then it in-
creases the chances that parties will go only to experts whose testimony can be bought. 
While as a proposition this may be accurate, it is not a good reason for denying discovery. 
In this situation the goal is to combat the abuse, not to refuse to adopt a worthy rule for 
fear that some may be moved toward improper hiring practices. It is no secret that under 
the present discovery system there are "experts for hire." The solution is stiffer penalties 
for experts' and attorneys' misconduct, not lower standards. 
Lastly, there is authority suggesting that plaintiffs and defendants be accorded different 
discovery treatment. See New York County Comm. on Profesional Ethics, Opinions, No. 
309 (1933); C. CURTIS, ITS YouR LAW 17 (1954). This view suggests that a plaintiff, saddled 
with the burden of proof, must disclose all relevant information, while the defendant may 
ignore facts not requested in discovery. This argument was rejected by the drafters of 
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) with regard to regularly retained experts; the argument is of no greater 
persuasiveness in the free agent context. 
41 One commentator has, however, suggested that there is authority to the effect that 
the hiring of free agents is unethical. Graham, supra note 34, at 195 n.55. The language he 
cites is from Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941): 
But there are cases where the tender of compensation should have no such ef-
fect. An expert employed by one of the parties ought not to be compelled to fur-
nish expert testimony to the other just because the latter offers him compensa-
tion. It is his privilege, if not his duty, to refuse compensation from one of the 
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discovery rules to each. 42 There are several reasons for this, the 
most obvious of which is that, because no detailed analysis of the 
policies underlying Rule 26(b)(4)(B) has been made, there is no 
reason to doubt the logic of applying the same rules to each. At-
torneys and judges have been said to look least to the reasons and 
policies underlying procedure and evidence. 43 
Due to the constraints of time and pressure, the legal profession 
tends to rely on recent cases and rules of thumb. 44 As a result of 
this practice, trial courts rarely get the sophisticated policy argu-
ments needed to sqpport an innovative change in the law. Appel-
late courts, which are more receptive to arguments based on un-
derlying principles counseling legal change, rarely review discov-
ery issues. Discovery rulings are not final orders and therefore 
are not generally appealable. 45 After final judgment they are re-
viewable on appeal, but the matter is frequently moot. Further, 
the broad discretion vested in trial courts over discovery matters 
will bar reversal ex,cept under very unusual circumstances. 46 
Though occasionally there will be review of discovery orders 
under a Rule 37 sanction procedure, 47 this is rare. 48 
parties when he has already accepted employment from the other, and such re-
fusal ought not of itself to result in his being ordered to testify. 
Id. at 595. 
Graham misconstrues this statement; Boynton was not a free agent case. The court in 
Boynton was considering the discoverability of another party's regularly retained expert. 
Taking the same position as the majority of courts in 1941, the Boynton court held that 
whether one party could compel discovery of another's expert witness was a matter of 
court discretion. The court, relying on the property rationale discussed in Part I B I, held 
that "as a discretionary matter, under the circumstances of the instant case, the defendant 
should not be permitted to obtain from an expert witness an opinion for which the plaintiff 
has to pay." Id. at 595. 
u See, e.g., Granger v. Smeal Mfg. Co., No. 76-CI-0200 (Cir. Ct. Washington County, 
Wis. Aug. 29, 1978) (on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW RE-
FORM). But see Sullivan v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 80 F.R.D. 489, 491 (D. Mont. 1978); 
Barkwell v. Sturm Ruger Co., Inc., 79 F.R.D. 444, 446 (D. Alas. 1978). 
43 I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE xiii-xiv (3d ed. 1940). 
44 Id. 
45 See, e.g., Browning Debenture Holders Committee v. DASA Corp., 524 F.2d 8ll, 817 
(2d Cir. 1975); American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 
277, 280 (2d Cir. 1967). 
46 See Huffv. N.D. Cass Co. of Ala.,468 F.2d 172, 176(5thCir. 1972); Stubbsv. United 
States, 428 F.2d 885,888 (9th Cir. 1970); Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F.2d 499,501 
(6th Cir. 1970). 
47 Under Rule 37 the court may impose the following sanctions on a party who attempts 
to thwart or evade a full and candid discovery: imprisonment for contempt of court, Rule 
37(b)(l); the entry of an order that designated facts be taken as established, Rule 
37(b)(2)(A); the entry of an order refusing the disobedient party the right to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, Rule 37(b)(2)(B); striking out pleadings or parts of 
pleadings, Rule 37(b)(2)(C); rendering judgment by default, id.; dismissal of claims or de-
fenses, id.; or assessment of costs and attorneys' fees, Rule 37(a)(4). 
48 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947); Gordon v. Federal Deposit Ins. 
Corp., 427 F.2d 578, 579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But cf Cromaglass Corp. v. Ferm, 500 F.2d 
601, 604-05 (3d Cir. 1974). 
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Another rarely allowed avenue of review of discovery matters 
is by way of interlocutory appeal under 28 U .S.C. § 1292(b). 49 
Generally, however, discovery questions do not satisfy the rigi°d 
criterion of that statute, which requires the issue to be "a control-
ling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for dif-
ference of opinion. " 5° Further, the trial judge must find that the 
granting of interlocutory review may materially advance the ulti-
mate termination of litigation. Even in those few cases where the 
trial court does so certify, the appellate court has discretion to ac-
cept or reject the certification. 51 Although writs of mandamus and 
prohibition are at times employed for this purpose, 52 use of this 
procedure to review a discovery order continues to be the excep-
tion rather than the rule. 53 The Supreme Court has stated that it is 
"unwilling to utilize [these writs] as substitutes for appeals. As 
extraordinary remedies, they are reserved for really extraordi-
nary causes. " 54 
If a challenge to the applicability of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) to the free 
agent situation were to arise, the realities of settlement and of ap-
pellate review therefore suggest that it would be likely to surface 
at the trial court level. 55 Several factors reduce the likelihood of 
the question ever being litigated, however. First, even at the trial 
court level, only a small number of cases go through to adjudica-
tion. The great bulk of all civil controversies are settled. Second, 
•• See Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 481 (4th 
Cir. 1973); Bakerv. F and F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 779 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 
966 (1973). 
50 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides: 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise ap-
pealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a con-
trolling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. 
The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be 
taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry 
of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall 
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of 
Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order. 
51 See United States v. Salter, 421 F.2d 1393, 1394 (1st Cir. 1970). 
52 See Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,109 (1964); Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 
509 F.2d 517,519 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Heathman v. United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California, 503 F.2d 1032, 1033 (9th Cir. 1974). 
53 See Kerr v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 425 
U.S. 949,949 (1976); American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 
F.2d 277, 283-84 (2d Cir. 1967) and cases cited therein. 
54 Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947). 
55 This was recognized at an early stage in the interpretation of the discovery rules in 
Maryland where the State Court of Appeals made it clear that the task of fitting the new 
procedure into the legal system would rest largely with the trial courts. See Roberts v. 
Roberts, 198 Md. 299,303, 82 A.2d 120, 122 (1951); Hallman v. Gross, 190 Md. 563. 574-75, 
59 A.2d 304, 309 (1948). 
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parties often grant informal discovery of non-trial experts without 
requiring a showing of the Rule 26(b)(4)(B) "exceptional cir-
cumstances'' formula. 56 When one considers the small percent-
age of cases that are not settled, the percentage of these in which 
discovery is not formally or informally granted, and the rarity 
with which these cases receive appellate treatment, it is no sur-
prise that the free agent issue has not yet received treatment by 
the courts or commentators. The discussion below deals with the 
free agent's status as it affects the triaVnon-trial expert distinc-
tion. 
B. The Trial/Non-Trial Distinction: Applications to 
the Free Agent Expert 
1. Contexts for Employment of the Free Agent Expert-Free 
agent experts will most often be employed in areas where multi-
party litigation involving experts is frequent. Thus, the most 
likely context for retention of the free agent would seem to be tort 
litigation, especially in the medical malpractice and products lia-
bility areas. Antitrust actions may provide another context in 
which this situation will arise. Cases where a free agent is hired 
may take a variety of forms. There may be multiple plaintiffs, 
multiple defendants, or both. The party concluding litigation, the 
party who thereafter retains the free agent, and the party who op-
poses free agent discovery may each be a plaintiff or defendant. 
Further variations are inevitable, since although the free agent 
may be designated either a trial or non-trial expert by his original 
employer, this is in no way binding on the new employer, who 
may choose to use the expert in a manner different from that 
suggested by the original employer. Still another situation is 
posed by the expert who is not retained by a second employer. 
Thus, the attempt to compel discovery of an expert whose em-
ployer is no longer involved in the litigation sets up a multitude of 
possible situations and accompanying problems which will be dis-
cussed in detail in the following sections. 
2. Litigation Strategies Underlying Employment of the Free 
Agent-There are three possible reasons for the retention of the 
free agent expert. The first is to educate the party in a general 
fashion concerning the merits of his case, hereinafter referred to 
58 Graham suggests that in thirty percent of the non-trial expert cases, disclosure be-
yond the acquisition of the expert's identity occurs. Moreover, Graham claims that this is 
the majority practice in Hawaii, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, Puerto Rico, 
and West Virginia. Graham, supra note 34, at 193 n.51. See also von Kalinowski, Use of 
Discovery Against the Expert Witness, 40 F.R.D. 43, 49 (1966). 
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as the "educational retention." Second, the party may engage in 
"offensive retention" to obtain information that can be used at 
trial against the opposing party. Third, a party may seek to obtain 
and conceal information that an opposing party could use at trial, 
hereinafter referred to as the "concealment retention. " 57 
In a case where one of several defendants concludes his litiga-
tion with a sole plaintiff, the free agent expert's potential knowl-
edge at the time of his reemployment falls into four pertinent cat-
egories: (1) information suggesting the plaintiff was at fault; (2) in-
formation suggesting the settling defendant was not culpable; (3) 
information suggesting another defendant was to blame; and (4) 
information suggesting an individual not before the court is at 
fault. The use to which this information might be put depends, of 
course, on who retains the free agent. A frequent motivation for 
the hiring of a free agent as a non-trial expert is to conceal detri-
mental information. 58 Since expert reports are rarely inc.onclu-
sive, at least one party presumably will have an incentive to con-
ceal such information. Moreover, since the most important dis-
tinction between the regularly retained non-trial expert and his 
free agent counterpart is that the free agent expert is often hired 
to conceal information, the extent to which information is gener-
ally concealable by parties is highly relevant. 
Concealment most often occurs when a settling party who may 
yet remain subject to suit, either on a related direct claim or on a 
claim for indemnification or contribution, seeks to limit access to 
whatever damaging material his opponent's experts have uncov-
ered. A settling party may, for example, restrict the discovery 
that would otherwise be allowed after settlement by insisting on a 
nondisclosure provision in the settlement agreement. 59 Further, it 
is clear that an expert may bind himself by a provision which for-
bids his working for another party to the litigation after his em-
57 Since it will not usually be possible for a court to discern a party's intent at the time of 
retention, it will be necessary to infer intent from the use of the expert as a trial or non-
trial expert. Where the free agent expert is retained as a trial expert the retention should 
be assumed to be an "offensive retention" since the expert will be used at trial. 
•• See notes 4 and 5 supra. 
•• This often allows plaintiff and defendant to come to a mutually satisfactory settle-
ment. For example, the plaintiff may settle with a defendant on terms favorable to the 
defendant upon the condition that the defendant does not provide another party with any 
damaging information he has uncovered. Since upon settlement a former party is no 
longer subject to discovery, any sharing of information is purely voluntary and a former 
party could, for whatever reason (settlement included), simply decide not to respond to 
another party's request for information. Alternatively, however, he may turn over - or 
even sell- the work prQduct to another party. L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, 
§ 46A.06[4] at 16A-89. But see Williamson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 21 Cal. 3d 829, 
582 P.2d 126, 148 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1978). 
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ployer settles. 60 However, should the former expert's work be 
subpoenaed, the settlement agreement could no longer control. 61 
Unless he is subpoenaed, however, an expert is never bound to 
produce information just because there is a demand for it. Thus, 
an expert may accept compensation for his promise not to reveal 
such information unless subpoenaed. It may be argued that there 
should be no right to limit access to information where a party has 
attempted to do so without a showing of reasonable grounds to 
fear a future related suit. Yet this approach would bring the court 
into the settlement process, and force it to evaluate the chances of 
future suit. Fortunately, this is unnecessary because even in the 
case where a party needlessly limits access due to a mistaken be-
lief of multiple exposure, chances are good that the unavailable 
information is of limited use in any suit other than one against the 
limiting party. Still, it is foreseeable that in some cases the infor-
mation would also be useful in a suit against another party to the 
litigation. Since a rule regulating a party's disposition of its work 
product cannot simultaneously protect a party against future re-
lated suits and also allow the information to be available for use 
against other parties to the litigation, one or the other value must 
take precedence. Two factors favor allowing parties to protect 
themselves against future related suits. First, because of the 
added expense such agreements entail for the limiting party, 62 it is 
80 This "freedom of contract" rationale is supported by Graham, supra note 34, at 195, 
who suggests that when a party contracts with an expert who may not meet the retaining 
party's expectations, an agreement may be entered into to prevent the expert from later 
working for another party to the litigation: 
Id. 
If the party making initial contact is aware of the possibility of a court compelling 
disclosure of the identity of an expert who for any reason fails to meet expecta-
tions, a carefully drafted agreement should contain an exclusivity provision pre-
venting the expert from consulting with any other party to the litigation. 
By comparison, an agreement between parties preventing the settling party's expert 
from working for any other party to the litigation should not be binding; it would be incon-
ceivable that two parties to a suit could, by their own agreement and without the consent 
of the expert, prevent him from working for a third party to the litigation. 
81 Settlement agreements are not binding on a court; the court may, upon a proper 
showing, order the expert to appear for deposition or to be available as a trial witness. See 
MooRE, supra note 37, ,i 26,66[1] at 26-469; Graham, supra note 33, at 935-36. Although 
the majority of American jurisdictions allow subpoenaing of an adverse party's expert, 
MOORE, supra, it is clear that there is no consensus as to what "proper showing" is 
necessary to compel testimony. See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1182, 1191-211 (1961). 
81 Experts will demand greater fees if their freedom to contract is to be limited. Simi-
larly, a party to the suit who made such agreement would demand compensation in the 
settlement figure. It is unlikely that these payments will become ritualistic and inexpen-
sive as the value of such a provision is positively correlated with the chances of future 
suit. Thus, cases where a party might enter into such an agreement because it was inex-
pensively obtained are the very cases where such an agreement is least likely to deny liti-
gants needed information. T. PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776). 
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unlikely that these agreements would take place in the absence of 
reasonable grounds to fear future suit. Second, as discussed ear-
lier, 63 in cases in which an extreme hardship would result, the 
subpoena is always available to override the settlement agree-
ment. 64 Thus, the settlement agreement is not a sure way of limit-
ing access to a party's work product. 
3. Discovery of the Free Agent Expert: Variations on a 
Theme-In the absence of an agreement to limit disclosure, the 
discoverability of the free agent is determined by his designation 
as a trial or non-trial expert. 65 Discoverability therefore often 
turns on the issue of which employer's designation should con-
trol. The designation given to the expert by the original employer 
arguably should not be used since it would deny discovery of a 
free agent trial expert simply because his former employer had 
not planned to put him on the stand. Similarly, it would allow dis-
covery of a non-trial free agent expert on the grounds that his 
previous employer had intended to call him to testify. It may be 
argued, however, that once an expert has been named as a trial 
witness and is therefore subject to discovery, a settlement and re-
hiring of the expert as a non-trial expert by a second employer 
should not deprive a party of discovery. This argument is un-
sound since an original employer who has designated his expert as 
a trial witness may at the last moment revoke this designation and 
•• See note 61 supra. 
•• The ability to subpoena pretrial discovery is of far greater value than the trial sub-
poena and should therefore be granted only upon a greater showing of need. There are 
several reasons this pretrial subpoena is of greater utility than its trial counterpart. 
First, a party seeking discovery, but being able to compel only a trial appearance, may 
be reluctant to call the opposition's expert for fear that the expert has become client-
oriented and will tend to testify in his employer's interest. See Friedenthal, supra note 22, 
at 484; Graham, supra note 33, at 934. A second fear is that since an expert compelled to 
testify generally must do so without compensation, MooRE, supra note 37, ,i 26,66LI] at 26-
469; Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 479-80, he is likely to be hostile to the subpoenaing 
party. Although the general rule is that the court has the right to compel answers only to 
questions within the existing knowledge of the expert, the reality of the situation is that 
"whenever an expert is subpoenaed ... he is forced to make adequate preparation to 
prevent his appearing foolish by being unable to respond to all questions concerning his 
expertise." People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros. and Co. v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 225, 72 
N.E.2d 165, 166 (1947); Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 481; Graham, supra note 33, at 934-
36. 
It would seem likely that an expert would react to being subpoenaed with the same hos-
tility that many people express when called for jury duty. In the interest of seeing the ac-
cused get a fair trial, however, the state makes it possible to be excused from jury duty. 
The subpoenaed expert has no such option and his hostility may be vented on the party 
who brought him into court. Although discovery is apt to create similar hostility. it affords 
an opportunity to gain whatever benefit is available without the incidental damage suf-
fered at trial. Thus, it is the extreme situation where an attorney will put his adversary's 
expert on the stand without knowledge of his testimony. See Friedenthal. supra note 22, 
at 469. 
•• See notes 10-14 and accompanying text supra. 
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thereby prevent discovery. 66 "To the extent that an original em-
ployer can withdraw his expert's designation, there is no reason 
to prevent the free agent's employer from doing the same. Thus, 
the discoverability of the free agent should be determined by the 
designation given by the new employer. 
a. Free Agent Trial Expert. Discoverability of the free agent 
designated as a trial expert is desirable for the same reasons that 
discovery of the regularly retained trial expert has been found ap-
propriate. 67 Liberal discovery of the regularly retained trial ex-
pert is allowed because it eliminates surprise at trial, improves the 
quality of cross-examination, and reveals only that information 
beneficial to the discovered party which would be disclosed later 
at trial. 68 These reasons, which have been used to justify liberal 
discovery of regularly retained experts, are equally applicable to 
the free agent trial expert. Therefore there is no reason to suggest 
an alternative standard of discoverability of the free agent trial 
expert. 
b. Free Agent Non-Trial Expert. By contrast, this convergence 
of policies supporting equal discoverability of free agent and regu-
larly retained trial experts is not present in the case of non-trial 
experts. Discovery of the regularly retained non-trial expert is 
severely limited in order to encourage parties to educate them-
selves without the fear of "uncovering information that would later 
be used against them. 69 In the vast majority of cases, however, 
the non-trial free agent expert is not hired to educate his client. At 
the stage in the proceeding where parties are settling, it is to be 
expected that all parties have already been generally educated re-
garding the merits of their case. 70 
The need to protect the "educational retention" in this situa-
tion is of relatively low priority. Further, the regularly retained 
non-trial expert is usually a fungible expert; at the time of hiring 
he knows no more about the case than any other expert in his 
88 But see Williamson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 21 Cal. 3d 829, 582 P.2d 126, 148 
Cal. Rptr. 39 (1978). 
87 See notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text supra. 
68 Jd. 
89 See Part I B 3. 
70 An exception to this generalization would be the case of a poor plaintiff with a claim 
against both a distributor and manufacturer. Finances may force him to settle the less luc-
rative of the two claims in order to finance the costs of the other. In this situation, it is the 
very act of settlement with one party which permits the plaintiff to make his "educational 
retention" of the expert. However, this does not work a hardship on the plaintiff since any 
expert he retains other than the free agent will be discoverable only in accordance with the 
regular discovery procedure of Rule 26. Further, discovery of the free agent will be an 
option open to all parties to the litigation. Thus, the plaintiff is not disadvantaged by his 
early settlement. 
SPRING 1979] The Expert Twice Retained 551 
field. The free agent, however, by virtue of his having already 
worked in the litigation, is hired for the unique information he 
possesses; he is no longer a fungible expert. 
Where the free agent is denominated as a non-trial expert, the 
appropriate discovery rule should discourage "concealment re-
tentions" by mandating liberal discovery of the non-trial free 
agent expert. As for a "lazy" party, he should not be rewarded by 
extending the protection provided for ''educational retentions'' to 
situations where, but for his laziness, the hiring party would al-
ready be educated on the merits of his case. 71 Discovery of the 
"concealment retention" is thus in accord with the underlying 
values expressed in Rule 26(b)(4)(B). 72 
The most difficult situation in which to justify liberal discovery 
is that in which no concealment is attempted. For example, where 
an employer retains a free agent as part of an "offensive reten-
tion," but finds the expert's information detrimental to his case 
and subsequently designates the expert a non-trial expert, liberal 
discovery would seem to result in unfairness to the employer. 
While discovery in this situation might seem disadvantageous to 
the retaining party, the situation would be no different if another 
party had retained the expert. In either case discovery would take 
place and the information would be revealed. Moreover, although 
the retaining party would have paid the expert, this cost would be 
shared by the discovering parties. 
Notwithstanding current discovery practice, liberal discovery 
of non-trial free agents should be the rule. Rule 26(b)(4)(B), by 
not mandating free discovery, implies that to some extent the 
71 Discovery of the free agent trial expert does not foreclose a party truly in need of an 
"educational retention" from retaining one, since liberal discovery of the free agent trial 
expert will not change the discovery standard for the party's regularly retained experts. This 
is true regardless of whether the regularly retained expert is employed before or after the 
employment of the free agent. If the regularly retained expert is a non-trial expert, discovery· 
will still proceed only under the "exceptional circumstances" standard of Rule 26(b)(4)(B). 
72 For example, the exceptional circumstances test would be met if one party went so 
far as to retain all the experts in a specialized field or even all those experts likely to agree 
with an opposing party. See Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 484. Cf. Bolich v. Rubel, 67 
F.2d 894, 895 (2nd Cir. 1933) (in a case where the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
sought to investigate the records of a taxpayer, discovery was justified "because all the 
facts are in the taxpayers hands."). Bolich was cited with approval in United States v. 
McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1967). Further, where the condition of certain items 
have been altered and only one party's experts have viewed them in their unaltered state, 
discovery by the other party should be mandated. See Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66, 68 
(W.D. Pa. 1974); Walsh v. Reynolds Metal Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378 (D.N.J. 1954); Colden 
v. R.J. Schofield Motors Co., 14 F.R.D. 521, 522 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Friedenthal, supra 
note 22, at 484; Note, supra note 34, at 281-82. See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 
511 (1947); cf. Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237,239 (D.R.I. 1957) (in an action for 
damages which alleged the presence of poisons in the blood plasma manufactured by the 
defendant, the plaintiff was entitled to discover the methods employed in the production 
of defendant's blood plasma since they were solely within the defendant's knowledge.). 
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"concealment retention" is to be tolerated. The Rule rightly ·con-
dones the concealment of the future report of an expert hired gen-
eraliy to educate a party. 73 It should not, however, condone a hir-
ing for the express purpose of a present concealment. Generally 
the results of the expert's work are known by the hiring party in 
advance of employment and the expert's services are procured to 
conceal that information. In essence, the hiring party seeks to as-
sert a similar right of concealment as to work done by the expert 
for the original hiring party without the presence of the educa-
tional rationale given for that right. The right to conceal informa-
tion in this situation is clearly inconsistent with the spirit of Rule 
.26.74 
c. Unretained Free Agent Expert. The unretained free agent 
might seem the most likely case for liberal discovery, since there 
is no party resisting disclosure. 75 This observation overlooks, 
however, the earlier suggestion that the expert who is no longer 
tied to a party is under no duty, in the absence of a subpoena, to 
respond to discovery. 76 At issue in such cases is the need on the 
one hand for availability of information to promote meritorious 
trial adjudication and the expert's right on the other hand to be 
free of the burdensome annoyance of non-party discovery. Where 
the party seeking discovery has not sought to retain the free 
agent, the expert's privacy interest is arguably the greater con-
cern, since his information is available simply upon payment of a 
73 The information sought to be uncovered by an opposing party from a free agent ex-
pert is usually that information gathered for the first employer. Once this information is 
disclosed there is no reason to prohibit the retaining party from concealing the expert's 
future product so long as the expert does not appear at trial. However, since at the time of 
retention it may be unclear whether the free agent will be a trial or non-trial expert, the tim-
ing of discovery for all free agents should be the same. 
74 In Barkwell v. Sturm Ruger Co., Inc., 79 F.R.D. 444 (D. Alas. 1978), an expert who 
had conducted substantial research on gun safety mechanisms and who had performed 
services for the plaintiff's counsel in other cases was retained as an independent consul-
tant by the defendant. The plaintiff sought discovery of the information which had been 
gathered by the expert prior to his being hired by the defendant. The court ruled that be-
cause the expert's information was acquired prior to his retention by the defendant the 
material was discoverable without regard to his status as an expert. Id. at 446. The identi-
cal fact situation produced similar results in Sullivan v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 80 
F.R.D. 489 (D. Mont. 1978). There the court held: 
[w]hile [the expert's] knowledge and opinions that plaintiffs seek to discover 
were developed for litigation, they were not developed for this law suit, and more 
importantly, were not developed for the use of the defendant because [the ex-
pert] was not in defendant's employ at the time. Consequently, defendant cannot 
shield [the expert] from deposition on these matters because 26(b)(4)(B) is not 
applicable. 
Id. at 491. 
75 The federal rules are silent as to the discovery of an expert whose knowledge of rele-
vant information at issue in 'the case makes him a desirable witness for one party to the 
litigation. See Graham, supra note 33, at 936. 
78 See notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra. 
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reasonable retainer. Moreover, while it may frequently be the 
case that the expert's inconvenience is not great, inconvenience 
is directly proportional to the number of parties requesting infor-
mation. For example, in a series of suits arising out of a mass air 
disaster, the plaintiffs expert, in the first settled case, is likely to 
be deluged with requests for information. The same would be true 
for experts involved in cases dealing with mass produced con-
sumer goods, such as cars, drugs, and children's toys. Thus, the 
unretained free agent should not be discoverable. Those few 
cases where this will work an unjustifiable hardship may be han-
dled by subpoenaing the expert's appearance at trial. 77 
d. Recalcitrant Free Agent Expert. Where the free agent expert 
refuses an offer of employment, a difficult situation is posed. In 
such cases there may be both a legitimate need for, and depriva-
tion of, important information. Yet the importance of this infor-
mation is not the paramount consideration; as indicated earlier, 
this information may be concealed by agreement between the ex-
pert and his original employer. 78 Although a rule denying discov-
ery in this situation might seem likely to deny parties important 
trial information, it would seldom work that way in practice: an 
expert with a valuable product is most unlikely to refuse a fair 
offer of compensation for what would amount to limited addi-
tional work. Indeed, the expert in possession of important infor-
mation may even seek to take advantage of his bargaining power 
to drive an unconscionable bargain. However, the fear of being 
subpoenaed and of being forced to divulge his information with-
out payment79 is arguably enough of an incentive to encourage the 
expert to bargain in good faith. 
e. Court Appointed Free Agent. There is, perhaps, another vari-
ation on the free agent theme. Since Federal Rule of Evidence 706 
allows the court on its own motion, or on the motion of any party, 
to appoint expert witnesses, 80 it would seem logical to discuss the 
appropriate discovery standard for the court appointed expert 
who later becomes a free agent. Such an occurrence, however, 
would be extremely unlikely. The expert in question is appointed 
by the court and the settlement of individual parties to the litiga-
tion should not affect his involvement in the litigation, since all 
77 As discussed in note 64 supra, a: trial subpoena is not as valuable as pretrial discov-
ery. However, where a party refuses to retain a willing expert it would seem that mandat-
ing liberal discovery of the expert would invade the expert·s right of privacy. 
78 See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra. 
79 The majority American rule is that experts, like lay witnesses, are not paid for sub-
poenaed testimony. MOORE, supra note 37, 11 26,66(1] at 26-469. 
8° FED. R. Evm. 706(a). 
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parties to the suit are entitled to review the expert's findings, take 
his deposition, and call him as a witness. 81 However, should the 
court excuse the expert before the conclusion of the trial and 
should the expert be retained by another party to the litigation, 
the problem of concealment retention would not be presented be-
cause the opposition would have had prior opportunity to depose 
him. Thus, the application of Rule 26(b)(4)(B), which will allow 
the retaining party to treat the expert as a non-trial expert and to 
conceal his future work product, is in line with protecting the 
Rule's "discouragement foundation." Of course, should the ex-
pert appear at trial, he would again be subject to Rule 26(b)(4)(A) 
discovery. 
4. Timing of Discovery of the Free Agent Expert-Since an ex-
pert's work is cumulative, the work performed for each employer 
will not be easily severed. Therefore, any discovery procedure 
should ideally take place soon after the free agent expert has been 
retained and before he starts work for his new employer. The 
easiest way to accomplish this is for the retaining party to notify 
the court and all other parties to the litigation that a free agent ex-
pert has been retained. The court would then set a free discovery 
period, after which the expert would start work for the new em-
ployer. Further discovery would not take place unless the free 
agent was later designated as a trial expert. At that point addi-
tional discovery would proceed under Rule 26(b)(4)(A). As the 
Rules now stand, there are, of course, no provisions to implement 
this procedure. A proposal for revision of Rule 26 is discussed in 
the next part. 
Ill. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 26 
This article has dealt with free agent expert discovery in light of 
the value choices underlying Rule 26. The promulgation of Rule 
26(b)(4)(B) reflects a decision to give greater weight to the need 
for parties to hire experts than to the need for disclosure of inf or-
mation. 82 This value judgment is followed here in the proposed 
s, Id. 
81 As discussed earlier, there was wide support for giving greater weight to the need for 
disclosure of information. See generally Part I B 3 supra. Added support for that view 
may be drawn from the cases decided subsequent to the 1970 recodification; the courts at 
times have strained Rule 26 in order to meet the need for greater disclosure of informa-
tion. In Pearl Brewing v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1976), for 
example, the court had before it a defendant's motion for discovery in an antitrust action. 
The information sought was the detailed structure of a computerized model of the Texas 
beer market developed by the plaintiff"s experts. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(8), the key to this 
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case should have been whether the defendant could make a showing of "exceptional cir-
cumstances" under which it would have been impracticable to obtain facts or opinions on 
the same subject by other means. Instead, the court's opinion opened with a long discus-
sion of the background and interpretation of Rule 26(b)(4)(B), concluding that since no 
effort had been made by any court to define "exceptional circumstances," these discov-
ery controversies were to be resolved on a case by case basis. Id. at 1137. The court 
evaluated 26(b)(4)(B), the "unfairness doctrine," "competing equitable and legal consid-
erations," and the facts of the case, and then concluded that granting discovery "would 
not be unfair to the plaintiffs," id. at 1137-38, adding that the plaintiff did not dispute that 
for defendants to properly understand the system they would have had to expend an "in-
ordinate amount of time, money, and resources" and doing so "might delay the conclu-
sion of discovery in the case." Id. at 1138. In essence, the court decided that meritorious 
adjudication demanded disclosure of the information, and then paid lip service to the rule. 
See Annot., supra note 40, at 468-69 for a similar interpretation. 
Discovery of the identity of a non-trial expert has also been liberalized in some jurisdic-
tions. The first court to deal with this problem ruled that the "exceptional circumstances" 
test of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) applied. See Perry v. W.S. Darley and Co., 54 F.R.D. 278, 280 
(E.D. Wis. 1971). This view conforms with the Advisory Committee's assertion that "a 
party may on a proper showing require the other party to name experts retained or spe-
cially- employed .... " Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 18, at 504. Despite the in-
tent of the Advisory Committee and the Perry decision, the court in Sea Colony Inc. v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 63 F.R.D. 113, 114 (D. Del. 1974), allowed discovery of a non-trial 
expert's identity. The court based its decision on the fact that (b)(4)(B) embraced only 
discovery of "facts known or opinions held by an expert" and concluded that the expert's 
identity fit neither category. This view was cited as the better authority in Baki v. B.F. 
Diamond Construction Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976), in which discovery was allowed 
in a similar situation. Baki also expanded the Sea Colony ruling, which had revealed only 
the name of the expert. lnBaki, the court held that "names and addresses, and other iden-
tifying information" of non-trial experts •'maybe obtained through properly framed inter-
rogatories without any special showing of exceptional circumstances in the absence of 
some indication that such information ... is irrelevant, privileged, or for some other rea-
son should not be disclosed." Id. at 182 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that the 
26(b)(I) requirement that the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any 
discoverable matter be supplied, was not limited to non-experts. In fact, such a broad 
umbrella encompasses even non-trial experts, "since they may have knowledge of matter 
discoverable or potentially discoverable under the provisions and requirements of Rule 
26(b)(4)(B)." Id. at 181-82. 
The covert liberalization of Rule 26 to meet the need for greater disclosure of informa-
tion has also gained a foothold in the two-step process of 26(b)(4)(A)(i) and (A)(ii). See 
notes II & 12 supra. Although certain information is discoverable without leave of court 
under (A)(i), additional discovery under (A)(ii) is available only upon a showing of "good 
cause." In Herbst v. International Tele. and Tele. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 530-31 (D. Conn. 
1975), the court did not discuss good cause. The court ruled that "once the traditional 
problem of allowing one party to obtain the benefit of another's expert cheaply has been 
solved, there is no reason to treat an expert differently than [sic] any other witness .... " 
This rationale, as applied to the deposing of an expert in Herbst, was held also to reach the 
production of documents in Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 74 
F.R.D. 594, 595 (D. Conn. 1978). Both cases have been cited with approval. See In re IBM 
Peripheral EDP Devices Litigation, 77 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Finally, 26(b)(4)(A) 
has also seen liberalization with regard to the definition of identity. In Clark v. General 
Motors Corp., 20 F.R. Serv. 2d 679, 683-84 (D. Mass. 1975), the court ruled that although 
the trial expert provisions, 26(b)(4)(A)(i), did not say anything about qualifications, such 
information was assumed to be a part of the expert's identity. 
While these rulings are admittedly limited, they must be seen in proper perspective. If a 
court does not follow the Pearl Brewing rationale and instead stays within 26(b)(4)(B), it 
cannot divulge a non-trial expert's findings. However, by giving the expert's name, iden-
tifying information, and qualifications, the court may reveal a great deal about the party's 
case. A plaintiff retaining an engineer, a doctor, or an anesthesiologist in a medical mal-
practice case gives some indication of how he plans to focus his case. Moreover, knowing 
which particular doctor, engineer, or anesthesiologist has been retained will prove still 
more valuable to the defendant. Experts are often associated with certain "schools of 
thought." Knowing which expert was picked to conduct a study will help one ascertain 
the kind of information the attorney is looking for. Further, the fact that the attorney has 
chosen to use one of several experts' reports may indicate what the expert has found or on 
which of several theories the attorney will proceed. 
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extension of Rule 26 to meet the free agent situation. 83 The fol-
lowing proposed addition to Rule 26 would allow-discovery of the 
free agent to the maximum extent consistent with the underlying 
values expressed in the Rule. It would thus allow liberal discov-
ery at the time of hiring to discourage "concealment retentions," 
yet still permit the retaining party to conceal the future work 
product of his non-trial free agent: 
26(b)(4)(C)84 Where the employer of an expert has set-
tled or otherwise concluded litigation, the former expert 
who is retained by another party to the litigation shall be 
discoverable in the following manner: 
(i) The retaining party shall inform the court and all 
other parties to the litigation within two weeks of such re-
tention. 
(ii) The court shall then set a date by which time any 
party seeking discovery shall conduct interrogatories 
and/or depositions. This date may, in the court's discre-
tion, be extended. 
(iii) After such date has passed, future discovery shall 
proceed under 26(b)(4)(A) or (B), depending on the ex-
pert's designation by the subsequent employer as a trial 
or non-trial expert. 
The major benefit obtained under this rule is the proscription of 
the "concealment retention. " 85 Obviously, the freer flow of in-
83 If, however, the formulation of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) had placed the burden of showing 
abuse on the party seeking discovery, see note 39 supra, a separate rule for free agent 
discovery would be unnecessary since the "concealment retention" would not pass mus-
ter under the unfairness standard of that rule. 
84 Rules 26(b)(4)(A) and (B) would remain unchanged, while the existing Rule 26(b)(4)(C) 
would be relabeled Rule 26(b)(4)(D). 
•• Courts may achieve results similar to this proposal by ruling that a free agent expert 
poses an exceptional circumstance per se. Cf. State v. Leach, 516 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Alas. 
Sup. Ct. 1973) (unique character of eminent domain procedures in condemnation cases 
constitute an exceptional circumstance per se ). This alternative is particularly appropriate 
in those jurisdictions which allow the jury to consider the proportionate liability of an al-
ready settled joint tortfeasor in awarding damages against the remaining defendant. For 
example, in Wisconsin the non-settling defendant is entitled to be credited with the 
greater of either the amount of the settlement or the percentage of the damages found by 
the jury which are attributed to the settling party because of his percentage of negligence. 
See Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963). The result of such a rule is 
that the claimant steps into the shoes of the settling defendant. He attempts to attribute 
the causal negligence to the non-settling defendants while the defendants attempt to con-
vince the jury that most of the causal negligence should be attributed to the settling defen-
dant. Where the settling defendant's experts have been retained by a non-settling defendant 
the alignment of interests is askew. The experts who have built the case that the plaintiff is 
propounding are in the employment of the other side. If the retained free agents were dis-
coverable as an exceptional circumstance per se the incongruity of the situation would be 
greatly reduced. 
A court may also allow discovery of the work product produced by the free agent for the 
first employer by ruling that it was not produced by the resisting party in "anticipation of 
litigation" as required by 26(b)(4)(B). See note 74 supra. 
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formation should, in theory at least, achieve the following goals: 
(1) assist in discovering truth and preventing perjury; (2) cut down 
on the number of false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses; 
(3) provide a simple, convenient, and inexpensive way of obtain-
ing facts otherwise obtainable only with great difficulty or not at 
all; (4) educa.te the parties as to the merits of their claims and de-
fenses, thus encouraging settlements out of court; and (5) narrow 
and simplify the issues at trial. Thus, with the proposed change 
there will be a higher correlation between settlement and validity 
of claim. 
One detrimental side effect of this rule may be a limiting of the 
parties' options in negotiating a settlement. It is generally thought 
that the greater the range of issues parties are free to negotiate, 
the better the opportunity for a satisfactory settlement. Since 
under this amendment a party defending against a multi-party suit 
would no longer be able to take advantage of the "concealment 
retention," it may be argued that his incentive to settle would be 
decreased. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The present Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not distinguish between dis-
covery of the free agent expert and the regularly retained expert. 
When one considers the small percentage of cases which are not 
settled, the percentage of these in which discovery is not formally 
or informally granted, and the rarity with which these cases re-
ceive appellate treatment, it is understandable that this issue has 
not yet received recognition by either the courts or the com-
mentators. Nevertheless, the discouragement rationale, which 
mandates the trial/non-trial expert discovery distinction for regu-
larly retained experts, suggests a more liberal rule when applied 
to the free agent. The liberalization of this rule must both discour-
age the "concealment retention" and protect the "discourage-
ment foundation" of Rule 26. The proposed Rule 26(b)(4)(C) 
meets both objectives by allowing liberal discovery of the free 
agent at the time of hiring to discourage "concealment reten-
tions" yet still permits the retaining party to conceal the future 
work product of his non-trial free agent. 
- Andrew J. Miller 
